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(Paper presented to the Highbury Housing Group, 3 June 
2013) 
Dr Bob Colenutt & Dr Martin Field 
University of Northampton 
 
Introduction 
Building a lot more new housing as fast as possible is now the 
call of many commentators across the political spectrum.  It is 
seen as both a critical economic stimulus and the culmination 
of frustration that over the last 20 years housing supply by the 
private sector has failed to keep up with demand and funding 
for affordable housing has fallen back; and therefore radical 
intervention of some kind is needed.     
The Coalition’s own strategies to stimulate private sector 
supply have had only limited impact so far, and opinion in 
other political parties and in think tanks appears divided or 
vague on the way forward for both market housing and 
affordable housing.  There no clear strategy on who would 
deliver substantially increased housing supply, where the 
funding would come from, and what type of housing would be 
built, and where.  The debate appears to be muddy over 
whether the critical issue is the huge shortage of affordable 
housing or whether it is a shortage of market housing.  In the 
current economic climate, housebuilders are unwilling to 
provide significant amounts of affordable housing as planning 
contributions.   
There is paralysis in Government about funding an increase in 
affordable housing by other providers notably local authorities 
or the RSL sector, though there is small scale support for self-
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build and co-ops.   The increase in private housing for rent is 
not solving the problem of affordability; on the contrary it is 
making it worse.      
On top of this, there is concern that while supply remains 
weak, and real demand relatively low, prices for housing both 
old and new houses remain high.  The contention made by the 
influential Barker Review in 2004 that by building substantially 
more housing prices will come down, does not now seem 
credible. 
Similarly, the argument that there is no land available for new 
housing is negated by the historically high level of land with 
planning permissions or optioned off, or in housebuilders 
strategic land banks.   
According to their Annual Report and Accounts 2012, the top 5 
UK housebuilders held 252,200 plots with planning consents, 
plus 231,359 plots in their strategic land banks (mainly 
optioned land).  Assuming each plot can accommodate 
conservatively approx 6 homes as the housebuilders suggest, 
this amounts to a supply of land for 2.9 million homes from 
just the top 5 house builders). 
 
Urban Extensions 
In the 2000s one of the planning vehicles to substantially 
increase supply (“a step change” as it was called ) was to 
identify large sites for urban extensions on the edges of growth 
towns in the South East. Labelled “Sustainable Urban 
Extensions” or SUEs, they were seen as the principal means by 
which sustainable development or sustainable communities 
would be delivered.  Much depended upon them.  
Despite Coalition planning reforms they remain as potential 
housing land in many Local Plans.  At public examinations of 
local plans the principle of large urban extensions is generally 
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supported by the private sector (though less so the 
“sustainable” part of the label), even if some communities are 
apprehensive about their impact.   
Professional bodies such as the TCPA and the RTPI are in 
favour of urban extensions as a planning response to the 
housing crisis. In view of the wide endorsement of the urban 
extension model it is important to put them under the 
spotlight. 
The aim of this paper, using the findings of an ESRC project in 
Milton Keynes and Northamptonshire, is to ask whether (a) the 
prioritisation of SUEs as a planning strategy can generate a 
step change in supply (b) whether delivery of SUEs will ensure 
as the name suggests the new housing development will be 
sustainable and (c) to suggest under what conditions can SUEs 
be a model for substantial new housing development  
(ref ESRC study, Tensions and Future Prospects for Sustainable 
Housing Growth; a case study of Northamptonshire and Milton 
Keynes: Open University and the University of Northampton).   
 
National supply and demand  
The Barker study concluded that to secure 1.1% house price 
inflation in England, 140,000 additional houses per annum 
would need to be built i.e. approx 331,000 per annum. Last 
year annual completions for all tenures was 108,840 (DCLG, 
House Building March 2013).    
One of the aims of the Sustainable Communities Plan 2003 
which called for a ”step change” in housing supply was to 
address the problem that “homes are unaffordable to people on 
moderate incomes” (p.6).  The theory was that by building 
substantially more housing, prices would become more realistic 
for moderate wage earners.   
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This objective is a central tenet of a recent report sponsored by 
the Local Government Association by the Centre for Cities think 
tank (2013).  This report suggests house price growth in some 
cities is driven by a “structural under-supply of housing” so 
that affordability will worsen “unless the supply of housing is 
greatly increased” (p.20).  Milton Keynes is cited as an 
example of a setting that has managed to achieve relative 
affordability in its local market area by building new houses 
roughly in line with local demand. 
It is in this context that identifying and delivering major urban 
extensions becomes is an attractive proposition for public 
authorities.  In the four Growth areas in the South East 
identifies in the Sustainable Communities Plan 2003, 
approximately over half of all planned growth was to be in 
extensions of 1000 plus homes.   
The Milton Keynes South Midlands Strategy (MKSM) 2005 
called for 150,700 new housing units between 2001-2021: 
61,500 in Milton Keynes and 99,500 in Northamptonshire.  Of 
these 50% or 75,000 would be in 26 SUEs. 
In the event, between 2001-2010, 47,000 new housing units 
were completed.  Yet of the 26 SUEs in the study area only 7 
got started (5 of these in Milton Keynes) by 2013 and none has 
reached full capacity.  Thus, almost all the growth in housing 
numbers has actually came from smaller sites which did not 
require extensive planning or infrastructure and invariably 
utilise standardised designs previously developed by the 
housebuilders.    
The designation of SUEs was part of a wider package of 
incentives to build new houses. There was a strategic planning 
framework which amongst other things identified Growth Areas 
and included housing targets; established enabling agencies 
(Special Delivery Vehicles) to take a lead in coordinating and 
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driving new development; and a Growth Areas Fund which  
provided a limited amount of pump priming. 
Given these more favourable economic and strategic planning 
conditions (i.e. when compared with today) the question is why 
has there been so little movement on the SUEs?    
 
 
The Reality of Delivering SUEs 
Many of the factors delaying the delivery of SUEs are unrelated 
to the recession (though it has exacerbated them), nor are 
they due to NIMBYism, or to “the planners”. They were evident 
before the recession hit and relate to a complex web of 
landownership, infrastructure provision, development industry, 
and agency factors. 
Most of the SUEs in Northamptonshire were designated on 
privately owned land (with the full support of private owners).  
In contrast, in Milton Keynes nearly all SUEs were owned by 
public bodies, and public ownership was itself a key factor in 
bringing land forward more quickly. Of the two sites in 
Northampton (formerly in the ownership of English Partnership, 
and then with the HCA) one has made significant progress, the 
other has stalled.   
Securing the appropriate funding, and then bringing delivery of 
infrastructure on-line, was consistently one the most important 
reasons for delay cited by ESRC interviewees.  The larger the 
development the more strategic infrastructure (land 
reclamation, roads, utilities) is required and the greater the 
amount of social and community infrastructure (schools, open 
space, public transport options) that has to be paid for. This 
means a longer planning timescale with master planning and 
extensive consultation. 
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In addition, they require exceptional collaboration between a 
wide range of public authorities who will need to provide 
services to make the development liveable and sustainable 
(education, police, transport, social services, health, 
community development etc).  On top of this are further local 
policy requirements for sustainable development measures 
such as Code for Sustainable Homes, sustainable construction, 
green energy measures, it is evident there is far more 
complexity in organising delivery of an urban extension than 
smaller sites of 50-200 houses. 
Much of the additional provision and the negotiation required is 
regarded simply as “a cost” by the house building sector that 
will not be redeemed by additional future receipts.  It is not 
estimated or accounted for as a longer term benefit.  
(Exceptionally for a housing development body, the large social 
housing group Places for People formerly a Housing Association 
say they practice a “patient capital model”).     
Disagreements between public authorities and developers take 
a long time to resolve.  The underlying adversarial relationship 
(evident in our interviews) between developers and local 
authorities prolongs negotiation.  The new focus on 
“development management” to “de-risk” development by 
earlier engagement over major schemes will make some 
difference but the reality is that for most SUEs, any notion of 
delivery or start on site in short time scales, is simply not 
feasible.    
The funding of infrastructure – in effect channelling a cocktail 
of funding streams into a single development - is a huge 
challenge.  Even innovations for forward funding such as the 
Milton Keynes Tariff (at £18,500 per house) are able to 
generate only 50% of the estimated cost of infrastructure 
needed for an SUE.  The Tariff does not for example include 
affordable housing contributions (MK Partnership 2012). 
7 
 
In the absence of any such tariff scheme to secure 
infrastructure funds, most local authorities are stuck with 
lobbying Government for strategic infrastructure funding, or 
pursuing section 106 contributions or future contributions from 
the new Community Infrastructure Levy.  
In relation to Government spending in the 2004-2010 period, 
our interviews identified that the capital funding streams of 
crucial central Departments such as Dept of Transport were not 
aligned with the Growth Areas programme, and that 
respondents believed the Growth Areas funding stream was 
subsequently too small to pay for the amount of infrastructure 
identified in Sub-regional Strategies such as Milton Keynes 
South Midlands. 
Section 106 contributions towards meeting local infrastructure 
needs were important in the boom years but have fallen off 
since and are now open to renegotiation.[ BOB : I thought 
there was always debate over how much s106 £ was evr being 
routinely secured in actual cash...]  CIL schemes are only now 
being prepared and there is already concern that they will be 
wholly insufficient to fund a full range of infrastructure 
particularly outside the highest priced development areas.  A 
large infrastructure funding gap seems likely to persist with no 
strategy to fill it. 
A related issue is one of agency i.e. who is leading the 
development process and responsible for planning and  
ensuring delivery.  It is apparent that The Milton Keynes model 
of a local authority (and previously the Milton Keynes 
Partnership) that owns land and does plan making and 
development control enables greater coordination, focus and 
faster delivery than fragmented responsibility among smaller 
local authorities or LDVs with few powers.    In our study area  
LDVs such the West Northants Development Corporation had 
limited influence over the direction and management of 
development.  They owned no land, they did not have plan 
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making powers, and the WNDC for example was instructed not 
to be involved in the SUEs once the Coalition Government 
came into power. This was to be left to the local authorities 
who arguably did not have the capacity to lead development 
and politically had mixed feelings about it.      
A final point concerns the all-important sustainability 
measures, so critical for the SUE concept.  Our study found 
that the policies and aspirations for sustainable development 
failed to make much impact (except on exemplar schemes such 
as the early English Partnership sponsorship of the Upton in 
Northampton).  Many reports and environmental assessments 
were made and long lists of sustainability indicators drawn up 
but when applications came forward and design plans were 
drawn up, house builders resisted these measures on grounds 
of costs, and local authorities for their part had little sense of 
prioritisation of the measures they had identified.     
Many of the obstacles to delivery of urban extensions are  
amply identified [Bob : what are we therefore saying hhere 
that is new or different?] in the interventions the HCA is 
making in a handful of prominent Urban Extensions.  In these 
schemes the HCA is providing substantial additional funding to 
unlock infrastructure and is providing expertise in project 
management to drive forward delivery.   
SUEs and prices 
The long lead times for planning and building out SUEs means 
that any idea they can have a short or even medium term 
impact on house prices is implausible in most areas.  But there 
is another reason for this.  The house builders model of 
delivery which drip feeds houses onto the market in a fashion 
precisely intended to keep up prices means that the 
relationship between supply and prices is far more complex 
than the idea that if you simply plan to build substantial 
numbers of new houses it will reduce prices. (see Adams et al)   
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What would it take to increase supply 
It would appear that the supply of market housing at a 
strategic level is impervious to levels of demand and therefore 
reforms to the supply side are critical in any alternative 
strategy for house building (even if mortgages become more 
easy to access).  The linking of the supply of affordable housing 
to delivery of market housing via planning contributions 
remains at best extremely unreliable and quite uncertain as to 
how much might ever materialise. 
The lesson from the Growth Areas is that although there was a 
sensible strategic planning framework in place and range of 
special initiatives to stimulate growth, there was overreliance 
on the housebuilding sector to deliver growth, and in particular 
sustainable growth.  Special measures such as the LDVs and 
the Growth Areas Fund lacked teeth and were insufficient.  
There were no effective coordinating mechanisms in place 
(except in Milton Keynes) to deliver the SUEs.  
There is little evidence that NIMYism played a part in slowing 
down growth  - all of the local authorities eventually signed up 
to the growth programme, some more enthusiastically than 
others. 
An alternative approach should consider the following 
measures;   
1) Mechanisms to bring land forward for development 
beyond the granting of planning consents, i.e. taxing land 
banks, or CPOing land or optioned land, or using 
Possession Orders on designated housing land in Local 
Plans that it is not being brought forward. 
2) Shifting the reliance of Government on the house builders 
sector and instead enabling and encouraging the 
expansion of other providers –  RSLs, co-ops, smaller 
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house builders, non-profit housing companies and local 
authorities.  A major intervention will be required by 
Government to increase substantially the contribution of 
these sectors if the demand for a full range of housing, 
types, tenures is to be delivered, in the right locations. 
3) Using development agencies, or local authorities powers 
to acquire land, negotiate, and drive forward development 
(but placed within a credible Governance framework).  
4) Forward funding of infrastructure is crucial.  CIL and 
section 106 rely upon a healthy private market which is 
absent in many areas at the moment, and in any case 
cannot fund more than 50% of total infrastructure costs at 
a maximum. Government must step in to reconnect with 
its capital funding programme to make strategic land and 
infrastructure investments with its own strategic spatial 
growth ambitions.  In principle the Sustainable 
Communities Plan identifying growth areas was a sound  – 
it was delivery of infrastructure and the nature of large-
scale UK house building is so problematical. 
5) Sustainability measures must be prioritised in detail in 
plan policies and master plans, and not left to last minute 
negotiation or sacrificed as when successive Governments 
prioritise housing numbers over quality. 
6) Governance mechanisms must bring to the table local 
communities, developers and a range of agencies and 
public. Development trusts such as that devised for  
Northstowe should be considered at an early stage to give 
communities a long term stake in the development as 
partners. Such mechanisms however need leadership and 
effective long term resourcing. 
7) [Bob : suggest a further point is inserted here about the 
potential for Local housing bonds or infrastructure bonds to 
secure community buy-in through local investments...] 
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Conclusions 
Focusing policy change on the form of new development 
whether Garden Cities or SUEs alone is not going to resolve 
the housing crisis.  Indeed new forms of development will be 
unable to offer a solution without significant complementary 
changes to make it possible for urban extensions or other 
forms to be deliverable and sustainable. 
The lessons from the Growth Areas SUEs include the 
importance of four key factors; bringing land forward for 
development; providing forward funding for infrastructure; 
enabling a range of housing providers to build on the sites; 
and having effective delivery and governance arrangements. 
Much of this is known from other studies both from the UK 
and elsewhere and is already available to the Government, 
since this is what the HCA is doing where it is able with its 
recent interventions in stalled urban extensions.   
Bringing forward the huge land banks of the house builders, 
that monopolise much of the potential building land, to 
enable urban extensions to be brought forward will be one of 
the biggest challenges. 
Strategically, the key policy change required is to depart 
from the dependence on the landowner/volume housebuilder 
model for delivery and to examine other options in a context 
where Government investment in land and infrastructure is 
regarded as a long term investment, and local authorities 
are also able to borrow long term or raise bond finance to 
invest in their own communities.    
 
